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The article provides a critical overview of the rise of resilience at the European Union 
(EU) level and to what extent its adoption is reshaping the terms of the EU’s 
peacebuilding interventions. In reaction to the perceived shortcomings of the "liberal 
peace" approach, international actors, including the EU, are now describing their 
interventions through a new resilience discourse. The article argues that resilience 
offers a four-fold contribution to promoting sustainable peace: 1) a focus on 
complexity; 2) a systems approach; 3) a shift toward local capacities; and 4) an 
emphasis on human agency. It then applies this framework to assess the 
implementation of the EU’s "resilience turn" since the adoption of the EU Global 
Strategy in 2016. Focusing on the EU’s discourse and its peacebuilding practices in 
 
 
the Western Balkans, the evidence suggests that the EU has only embraced a 
systems/integrated approach, while neglecting deeper understandings of complexity, 
local capacities and human agency. As a result, the contribution of resilience to EU 
peacebuilding remains limited.   
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Resilience has emerged as a main theme of intervention in several policy fields, including 
most aspects of civil protection, counter-terrorism and disaster risk reduction. It has also 
emerged as a development strategy tool as pursued by the main international 
organizations and aid agencies. Indeed, it is said to provide a bridge between different 
policy areas, notably short-term humanitarian intervention and longer-term development 
strategy. By contrast, the role of resilience in peacebuilding strategies has yet to be fully 
developed as international organizations are only just starting to formulate ideas in this 
field--see, for example the recent United Nations (UN) approach to "sustaining peace" 
(United Nations General Assembly, 2016; United Nations Security Council, 2016). This 
article looks at how these arguments are starting to emerge at the European Union (EU) 
level, seeking to identify what might be distinctive about the resilience approach and the 
extent to which this is realized in EU practice. Thus, the article examines what difference 
resilience makes in terms of peacebuilding implementation compared to previous 
concepts. In order to explore this question, this article first identifies what its novel about 
this approach, it examines whether this has been captured by the EU’s discourse on 
resilience, before analyzing its implementation both in Brussels and in recent EU 
practices in the Western Balkans. We question what resilience is being used for by 
examining these discourses and practices, both in relation to current global trends and in 
relation to the EU’s own specific ideas, interests and challenges. 
 
To assess the embrace of resilience in EU peacebuilding initiatives, the article 
employs a framework that highlights four key features of resilience that we feel make it 
most attractive to those seeking sustainable peace. These four features are: 1) a focus on 
complexity; 2) the way resilience advocates a systems approach; 3) how resilience 
reinforces the shift towards local capacities; and 4) an emphasis on human agency. 
Following this, we use the above four features of resilience as yardsticks to assess the 
EU’s implementation of the resilience turn in two steps. First, we turn to the EU’s 
discourses to look at how the EU has adopted the resilience turn at the Brussels level, 
focusing on the implementation of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) 
(European External Action Service, 2016) and the  Joint Communication on A Strategic 
Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action of 2017 (European Commission & 
 
 
High Representative, 2017). Second, we look at the EU’s track record in the Western 
Balkans which brings in the EUGS and the EU’s enlargement policy.  
  
Looking at EU practices in the Western Balkans, and specifically in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (thereafter Bosnia), we find that out of the four elements identified above, 
the EU has prioritized the implementation of a systems approach at the expense of the 
other three elements. Thus, the development of an integrated approach--a more 
coordinated strategy in relation to conflicts and crises -- has become the sine qua non of a 
resilience turn in EU peacebuilding. Thus, in the Balkans and elsewhere in the 
neighbourhood, the EU has translated resilience into something consistent with the EU’s 
interests rather than something that might be in the interests of effective peacebuilding 
(see also Korosteleva, 2019; Petrova & Delcour, 2019). By contrast, and despite the 
rhetoric contained in EU policy documents, embracing complexity and non-linearity, 
promoting local ownership, and focusing on individual local agency seem to have 
dropped out of the picture when it comes to implementation. In sum, while the literature 
on resilience makes the case for a distinctive approach that might offer peacebuilders new 
tools for dealing with the four key features of resilience, we find that the EU’s practice 
remains fairly consistent with long-standing EU approaches and interests.  
 
The promise of resilience in peacebuilding 
 
While resilience is well established in climate change and disaster risk reduction 
initiatives, humanitarian intervention and development strategies (see Korosteleva & 
Flockhart, in press), it has not yet played such a key role in the development of 
peacebuilding perspectives. In the UN context, resilience has only recently been 
incorporated into discussions about "sustaining peace" (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2016; United Nations Security Council, 2016). Drawing on the systems 
ecology literature (Holling, 1973), resilience can be seen as the ability of individuals or a 
community to cope with or adapt to violent conflicts in order to foster a more sustainable 
peace. This definition also fits well with the policy and scholarly shift toward the "local," 
and with "hybrid" or "pragmatic" approaches to promoting peace (de Coning, 2018; Mac 
 
 
Ginty, 2014; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Based on ecological understandings of 
resilience, we argue that this concept can appear to be attractive to policy makers as they 
develop the EU’s position on sustainable peace: 1) because of its focus on complexity; 2) 
by advocating a systems approach; 3) by supporting the shift towards local capacities; 
and 4) by placing emphasis on human agency.  
 
We start with complexity because it is probably the most distinctive feature of a 
resilience approach. Complexity thinking is attractive to peacebuilding because it sees 
people as embedded within complex social relations, while social processes are seen as 
non-linear with no straightforward causes or outcomes (Chandler, 2014). This idea also 
reinforces the current narrative that established liberal approaches to peacebuilding have 
failed and that we need to radically rethink how we intervene into complex social and 
political environments (Joseph, 2016). Societies are seen as in a constant state of flux--
something that is intended as a general claim about contemporary social life, but which 
clearly has an added relevance for conflict-prone societies (United States Institute of 
Peace, n.d.). The hubris of liberal peace is thrown into doubt by the suggestion that there 
are no clear or predictable outcomes, no clearly identifiable patterns or processes, no 
clear causes of crises or readily identifiable solutions (see also Bargués-Pedreny, 2019). It 
is this understanding of complexity that gives resilience its novelty. However, because 
complexity is ambiguous in meaning, the EU’s understanding is allowed to slip back into 
more mundane arguments about multiple actors and competing agendas. 
 
For resilience scholars, complexity forces us to rethink how we live with 
uncertainty and crises (Chandler, 2014). In contrast to previous understandings of 
peacebuilding, complexity forces us to think about how we deal with problems that 
cannot fully be resolved or which may have no endpoint (de Coning, 2018). Complexity 
provides the ontological ground for the normalization of crises and conflicts (Evans & 
Reid, 2014). Into this situation, resilience emerges as not only the best way to cope with 
such conditions, but actually as a positive, self-enabling response to such challenges. 
Transformative understandings of resilience see crises as an opportunity to reorganize. 
Embracing increasing diversity, flexibility and adaptability among conflict-affected 
 
 
communities can be seen as the best way of responding to shocks and stresses (Van 
Metre & Calder, 2016). Showing some skepticism toward more statistical and predictive 
accounts of social behavior, resilience embraces a more ecological view of adaptive life 
that embraces uncertainty, surprise, and contingency (Duffield, 2011, p. 130). 
 
Resilience approaches promote the idea of complex adaptive systems. Gunderson 
and Holling (2002) use the term panarchy to indicate the "multiple scales of space, time 
and social organisation" (Welsh, 2014, p. 17) forming a system that is self-organizing but 
with complex, non-linear outcomes and effects. In human terms, this means viewing 
social communities in terms of formal and informal networks that may provide the 
resources for and enhance the capabilities of resilient individuals (Menkhaus, 2013). The 
key ways that this might be done are through developing adaptive capacities and social 
learning (Berkes & Ross 2013). With the notion of complexity in the background, the 
resilience approach allows us to question the idea of a standard practice for international 
interventions, while maintaining the belief that we can improve our understanding of how 
to deal with complex situations. 
 
A second way that resilience relates to peacekeeping is through its advocacy of a 
systemic approach--although we will see that there are significant contradictions in this 
argument. Nonetheless, the argument for a systemic approach is significant and comes 
from the influential arguments for resilience within the ecology literature of the 1970s. 
This began with Holling’s (1973) definition of ecological resilience as a “measure of the 
persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still 
maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables” (p. 14). This 
challenges the idea of complex systems returning to the same state of equilibrium and 
later approaches would place greater emphasis on ideas like self-organization, functional 
diversity, and non-linearity (Gunderson, Holling, Pritchard, & Peterson, 2002, p. 530). 
This systemic approach requires bringing together and coordinating different actors and 
instruments in order to address multi-level and multi-causal processes. Hence, while the 
previous peacebuilding scholarship had already advanced a systemic approach where 
peacebuilding activities need to be understood as being part of larger systems (Lederach, 
 
 
1997), the resilience approach relates this to the conditions of complexity outlined above. 
However, in the peacebuilding jargon, such a systemic approach has been translated into 
integrated, comprehensive, or whole-of-government approaches as illustrated by the 
cases of the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN (Faleg, 2018). 
We will argue here that this becomes the main reason for why resilience is attractive to 
the EU, so much so that an "integrated approach" threatens to undermine other distinctive 
elements of resilience in EU peacebuilding. 
 
The third argument for resilience is that it is consistent with peacebuilding’s 
"local turn" and bottom-up approach as well as arguments for hybridity and a focus on 
the everyday (see Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, Korosteleva, 2019; Petrova & Delcour, 
2019). This should be considered as a reaction to the perceived failure of liberal peace 
and large-scale interventions focused on externally-driven institution building (Haldrup 
& Rosén, 2013; Juncos, 2017). Indeed, this failure is almost celebrated as freeing 
intervention from the hubris of liberal universalism and opening our eyes to the 
contributions of different cultures and identities (Bargués-Pedreny, 2015). Resilience 
promotes the idea of locally-owned capacities and capabilities and supports the turn away 
from large-scale external statebuilding projects. The role of international organizations 
should be to facilitate the peace process, thus supporting the argument, influenced by 
Foucault, that contemporary forms of governance seek to manage populations “from a 
distance,” while promoting self-governance and “care for the self” wherever possible 
(Joseph, 2013).  
 
Local communities are the focal point of resilience, something consistent with 
arguments about social capital and local networks. Such arguments show how resilience 
appears to be offering peacebuilding something new, yet actually something quite 
familiar. It also carries over into arguments about empowering local actors, supporting 
local networks, making use of local resources and sharing local knowledge (Mac Ginty & 
Richmond, 2013). It tries to bridge short-term and long-term peacebuilding objectives 
while also supporting hybrid solutions and transitional justice. There is a double 
attraction in this approach. First, it turns the international community away from the 
 
 
responsibility for large scale intervention, placing the responsibility for resilience on local 
communities themselves. This is attractive in an age of austerity and it also fits with the 
view that liberal peace has failed, large-scale institution building does not work and that 
the conditions of complexity, as described above, make rational planning and institution 
building a thing of the past. Second, it places responsibility on the local population in 
such a way as to appear positive and enabling (Joseph, 2016). Instead of emphasizing 
weakness, failure, and fragility, a resilience-building approach highlights the powers of 
human agency as discussed below. It also strengthens the cultural turn in peacebuilding–
"enhancing resilience thus can be interpreted as a strategy that takes a constructivist 
interpretation of culture as a resource to be used positively in an endogenous peace-
building process, respectful of pluralism" (Bargués-Pedreny 2015, p. 121). In this way 
resilience, continues previous discourses of human security and local ownership while 
offering a bit more nuance and some caution in relation to local capacities, promoting 
these, while emphasizing the need to be more pragmatic and adaptable in the face of 
complex challenges. 
 
Fourthly, resilience offers a more human-centered perspective. This should not be 
seen in isolation, but alongside some of the changes mentioned above–the local, the 
everyday, and the hybrid (Chandler, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2014). Instead, like Sen’s 
capabilities approach to development or the rise of the wellbeing agenda, this is a more 
individualistic approach to human security and development that goes directly to the 
people rather than their institutions and which promotes the idea of human capital, 
capabilities and capacities. Translated into the language of peacebuilding, Chandler 
(2015) writes of “the internal capacity of societies to cope with crises, with the emphasis 
on the development of self-organisation and internal capacities and capabilities rather 
than the external provision of aid, resources or policy solutions” (p. 13). 
 
This has been noted in discussions about the use of resilience by international 
organizations. Haldrup and Rosén (2013) mention that capacity building initiatives now 
focus on the individual, rather than the institution while Van Metre and Calder (2016, p. 
20) talk of the “heuristic shift” to local agency. The capacities of local people are 
 
 
rediscovered, their networks, social ties, knowledge and resources now become a source 
of resilience (United States Institute of Peace, n.d.). And if this is not sufficient, 
individuals and communities have the ability to adapt and learn from shocks and crises. 
For Adger (2000, p. 361), community resilience develops the qualities of awareness, 
coping strategies, social learning and innovation. For Menkhaus (2013, p. 6) the qualities 
of resilience are deeply embedded and involve common interests, shared narratives and 
patterns of trust, with local leaders prepared to take risks for peace. Resilience 
approaches to peacebuilding thus need to tap into these internal capacities and the critical 
agency of the local (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2013). This gives some indication of the 
possibilities that a human turn might possess, but this must be tempered by our 
understanding of the individualistic interpretation that often gets applied to human 
agency by international organizations. 
 
Having outlined four reasons why resilience appears attractive to peacebuilders 
we now turn to the EU’s recent emphasis on resilience to determine the extent to which 
the EU has embraced these four elements of resilience at the level of policy (in Brussels) 
and its implementation on the ground (in the Western Balkans). We argue that although 
the most distinctive elements of resilience are the focus on complexity and complex 
systems, the implementation of this approach by the EU has mainly focused on the EU’s 
own problems of systemic coordination.  
 
The resilience "turn" and the implementation of the EU Global Strategy 
 
Drawing on an analysis of key EU documents and interviews with EU officials in 
Brussels,1 this section seeks to determine what difference resilience makes in terms of 
peacebuilding implementation compared to previous approaches. Both the EUGS 
(European External Action Services, 2016) and the new EU Joint Communication on 
Resilience (European Commission & High Representative, 2017) identify resilience as 
 
1
 This section draws on nine interviews with diplomats and officials from the European 
Commission (Directorates-General ECHO and DEVCO), European External Action Service, and EU 
Delegations conducted in September 2017 and January 2018. Interviews are coded to maintain the 
anonymity of the interviewees. 
 
 
one of the key priorities for the EU’s external action. Resilience in EU foreign policy has 
been lauded as a new paradigm, which might radically transform this policy area (Juncos, 
2017; Tonra, 2018; Korosteleva, 2019). Yet, recent arguments for resilience rely on 
understandings of resilience work that the EU has been doing for some time (interview 
#21, 23, 24). Indeed, the main EU definition of resilience remains the one provided in 
2012 as “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to 
withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks” (European 
Commission, 2012, p. 5). Thus, for all the discussion about complexity, social 
construction, culture, and the human found in the scholarly literature, actual EU policy 
has lagged behind as discussed below.  
 
The holy grail: An integrated approach to conflicts and crises 
 
Our evidence suggests that when it comes to how the EU understands resilience in 
peacebuilding, fostering an integrated EU external action is considered to be by far the 
main added value of this approach. According to an European External Action Service 
(EEAS) official, resilience-building is about "taking a systems approach” (#22; see also 
#27, 28, 29). The prioritizing of an integrated approach is consistent with the EU’s 
longstanding focus on developing a coherent and comprehensive external action. It is also 
justified on the basis of increasing complexity. For instance, it is argued that "the 
integrated approach captures the multiple ways – in time, space and policy sectors – in 
which the EU can tackle operationally the complexity of conflicts to promote human 
security" (European External Action Service, 2019, p. 22). Yet, the prioritization of the 
integrated approach has more to do with the EU’s own anxieties as an international actor 
(Joseph & Juncos, 2019) than with the aims of peacebuilding per se. Thus, the EUGS 
speaks of the need to adopt a multidimensional, multiphased, multilevel, and multilateral 
approach (High Representative, 2016; see also European Commission & High 
Representative, 2017). According to a Commission official (#26), "the new [resilience] 
approach builds on all the existing tools, so this is why we emphasize the integrated 
approach, while respecting the different mandates of the different actors, and in 




Nevertheless, clear and significant divisions within the EU do exist and the 
resilience turn should be seen in relation to these. That it offers a comprehensive or 
integrated approach suggests that EU policy is not comprehensive or integrated enough, 
which in turn points to the issue of whether resilience is an approach that recognizes, 
reflects, or indeed, exacerbates, such divisions. In a positive sense, resilience might be 
said to help the EU bridge humanitarian, developmental, security, economic, and 
environmental approaches, moving a field like peacebuilding from a series of one-off, 
technical, and project-driven interventions to a more systemic approach that tries to 
address the root causes of conflicts. For instance, the Council Conclusions on 
Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus of May 19, 2017 thus urge the 
European Commission and the member states to foster such an approach in a number of 
pilot countries (Chad, Nigeria, Sudan, Iraq, Myanmar, and Uganda), with a view to put in 
place joint analysis and where possible, joint planning and programming. More recently, 
Directorates-General DEVCO and ECHO have led the work on Joint Humanitarian and 
Development Frameworks (JHDF) as a basis for joint humanitarian and development 
planning and programming (see Anholt & Sinatti, in press).  
 
However, it is also easy to see how this can exacerbate already existing divisions 
between different EU actors since this might confuse the relationship between different 
departments such as ECHO and DEVCO as well as the EEAS. These have their own 
strategic interests linked to institutional incentives, bureaucratic conditioning, and role 
identities. When reflecting on the implementation of the new resilience "turn," an EU 
official (#23) explained that  
  
We have made progress liking humanitarian aid and development programmes, in 
particular, in declarations and policies (development-security nexus, etc.). 
However, in practice, there have been less progress. This is particularly the case 




The same official (#23) noted that there has been some resistance to cooperation in the 
past from development actors regarding the launch of certain projects in the context of an 
ongoing conflict. Other officials were more optimistic about the prospects of cooperation 
between humanitarian and development actors on the implementation of a resilience 
approach (interviews #28, 29). For instance, one official (#28) mentioned that  
 
 in pilot countries, we are more systematically getting together to get a common 
 understanding, to identify common objectives and to see whether we can work 
 together and to be more complementary in our programming […] A lot of good 
 positive developments, with some difficulties here and there, but a lot of efforts 
 from all sides to work together and avoid silo approaches.  
 
Complexity and principled pragmatism 
 
Turning to another interrelated component of resilience, that of complexity, there is some 
evidence at the policy level of an increasing commitment on the part of the EU to foster 
such an approach, but here the picture is more mixed. In fact, the EU uses a very limited 
conception of complexity that says little about such things as systemic complexity, 
panarchy, or non-linearity and essentially boils down to the view that there are multiple 
actors in multiple contexts. The EUGS is justified on the basis that the EU operates in a 
more complex world, a more connected world, and a more contested world (European 
External Action Service, 2016, p. 11). This then supports the more realist argument that 
the EU will be guided by clear principles that "stem as much from a realistic assessment 
of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better 
world" (European External Action Service, 2016, p. 11; see also Tocci, 2019). According 
to one official this means that “the normative approach is seen more critically" (#22). In 
other words, while in the past “we were supposed to transform/shape the outside world. 
There was also this idea of promoting values. Now we say that we also need to promote 




Yet, the addition of principled pragmatism somewhat complicates our 
understanding of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding since the EU’s turn to resilience 
while occasionally embracing the ideas of systemic complexity and non-linearity, 
generally undermines these notions by pursuing a return to the more comforting 
teleological notions of the liberal peace. In this regard, resilience features “democracy, 
trust in institutions and sustainable development” (European External Action Service, 
2016, p. 24) as its key long term goals. This is particular so in relation to the EU’s self-
conception as a normative power, something that is surely at odds with the pragmatism of 
much resilience discourse (Juncos, 2017). While the EUGS might recognize that other 
non-liberal “paths” are possible (European External Action Service, 2016, pp. 25-26), the 
Joint Communication explicitly states that “[t]his work will be grounded in the EU’s 
commitment to democracy and human and fundamental rights” (European Commission 
& High Representative, 2017, p. 4) and it goes on to identify certain core liberal values 
like “respect for democracy, rule of law, human and fundamental rights and …inclusive 
long-term security and progress” (European Commission & High Representative, 2017, 
p. 3; see also European External Action Service, 2016, p. 13). This suggests that the EU 
has not fully bought into a more pragmatic approach to peacebuilding or the kind of post-
liberalism suggested by resilience discourse (Chandler, 2014). These contradictions were 
also reflected in the language of some of the officials. Hence while resilience meant that 
“we cannot impose our ways,” the same official also stated that "the promotion of the 
EU’s core values is intrinsic to resilience. If we do not respect these values, we won’t be 
resilient" (#21). Other officials acknowledged, "we still care about broader values such as 
democracy, rule of law, human rights" (#22) and they had to "put democracy and 
people’s rights first" (#29).  
 
In sum, despite references to complexity, the EU’s approach to resilience is a linear 
one where EU values constitute the end goals, even where these are mediated by stability 
and security concerns. The assessment of the implementation of the EUGS is clear in this 
regard: "These two priorities [resilience and the integrated approach] are not meant to 
replace the goals of democracy, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development and 
 
 
peace. They are rather intended as complementary, not substitutive, priorities" (European 
External Action Service, 2019, p. 22). 
 
Local ownership and human agency 
 
The final point relates to the EU’s commitment to local ownership and local agencies in 
EU peacebuilding. The EU’s approach to resilience claims to help “partner countries” by 
promoting people-centered approaches (European Commission, 2013, p. 3; European 
External Action Service, 2016). This is specifically framed as capacity to adapt. For 
instance, the EU’s toolkit for capacity development states that projects must be owned by 
those who seek to develop their capacity; “otherwise it [capacity building] simply does 
not happen” (European Commission, 2011, p. 9). In relation to security sector reform 
(SSR), the EU’s strategic framework emphasizes the need for "nationally owned 
processes” (European Commission & High Representative, 2016, p. 7). Thus, resilience 
building initiatives must “include the participation of the people affected or at risk, of 
communities, governments and civil society” (European Commission, 2019). For 
instance, reflecting on the implementation of resilience, one EU official (#22) stated, "we 
need to understand that we need to work with the resources we find in these countries […] 
The thinking behind is one of shared responsibility. We need to move away from 
traditional donor-recipient country." Another official (#23) also emphasized the focus on 
local ownership and agency and the people-centre notion of resilience: "It means working 
with people, a bottom up approach, underpinned by a very strong analysis of their risks 
and vulnerabilities […] It is about more ownership and building local capacities." 
 
Yet, the same official (#22) acknowledged that despite this commitment to 
“targeting individuals and communities … the idea of resilience has more to do with 
resource constraints. There are more crises around the world and we need to do more, but 
there are less resources.” This might explain the EU’s shallow commitment to local 
ownership and agency as discussed in the next section. Other officials also mentioned 
that compared to the original development-driven 2012 resilience approach, the EUGS 
approach to resilience paid more attention to the state level and state actors despite and 
 
 
that there might be some tensions between state and societal resilience (interviews #27, 
28, 29). 
 
In sum, the rhetoric of EU peacebuilding acknowledges the four key contributions 
made by resilience, although from this perspective, it is also clear that the emphasis is 
already on the need to foster an integrated approach between different actors and 
instruments for practical, but also existential reasons. There are basic existential reasons 
for this. Universal liberal values are part of the EU’s self-understanding. The rhetoric of 
local ownership and agency also fits with the EU’s normative power identity. There are 
also more straightforward institutional interests at stake meaning that new ideas like 
resilience end up being "translated" by older institutional features and path dependencies 
(Joseph & Juncos, 2019). As the resilience approach is translated by different actors, 
institutions, and narratives, it becomes less clearly a new paradigm for EU foreign policy 
and more an expression of the EU’s own complex and multilevel structure. This is ironic 
given that resilience is seen as a way of developing a comprehensive approach to external 
conflicts and crises when in fact causality is probably working in the other direction with 
the EU’s understanding of resilience a product of internal differences and divisions. By 
engaging in the sort of resilience-building projects discussed below, the EU can instead, 
try to disguise such differences behind the projection of an integrated approach that 
everyone supposedly agrees upon. 
 
Implementing the EU’s resilience approach in the Western Balkans 
 
The Western Balkans is an ideal place to start examining whether resilience constitutes a 
new approach for the EU, fulfilling the characteristics of being a fragile region with a 
complex interplay of internal and external factors including weak social and economic 
structures, fragile democracy, corruption, and clientelism as well as obvious ethnic 
tensions that seriously test the EU’s neighborhood policy.2 A report on the EU’s approach 
 
2
 The argument of this section is supported by a range of empirical data derived from documentary 
analysis of public and semi-confidential EU documents and 20 interviews conducted in Sarajevo and 
 
 
to the region suggests that “nurturing state and societal resilience in the Western 
Balkans… [helps the EU in] addressing the region’s capacity to cope with those multiple 
challenges… [and] is also making a long-term investment in the interest of its own 
citizens” (Lange, Nechev, & Trauner 2017, p. 8). A European Parliament report also 
argues that "EU policy in the Western Balkans has shifted from one of stabilisation and 
containment to a much more ambitious policy of ‘positive peace’-building" (European 
Parliament, 2018, p. 1). This policy combines the EU’s security concerns about the 
neighborhood with strengthening its own self-identity as a progressive actor. That this is 
bound up with the accession process only further highlights the fact that this is about 
strengthening values. However, these values are a reflection of the EU’s deeper identity 
rather than something specific about resilience as can be seen the following passage from 
the Joint Communication:  
 
The EU global strategy places a particular focus on resilience in the EU's 
neighbouring countries. This reflects the special political commitments of the 
accession process and the EU's neighbourhood policy; the close integration of our 
economies and societies; the interdependencies in our broad security interests; and 
the exposure that some of our neighbouring countries have to geopolitical 
rivalries. […] At the core of this process is the "fundamentals first" approach, 
focusing on rule of law, human and fundamental rights, democratic institutions, 
including public administration reform, as well as economic reforms and 
competitiveness. (European Commission & High Representative, 2017, p. 14) 
 
The "principled pragmatism" of the EUGS is reflected separately rather than conjointly, 
as geopolitical or realist pragmatism towards security issues and as longstanding EU 
principles that represent traditional approaches to peacebuilding–good governance, rule 
of law, market economies–rather than being a commitment to how resilience-building 
might come to see things differently. More specifically, these contradictions are also 
evident in the European Commission’s response to protests and discontent in the Western 
 
Mostar in November 2016 with EU officials, Bosnian officials, and representatives from civil society 
organizations. Interviews are coded to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees. 
 
 
Balkans with the relaunch of "a credible enlargement perspective" for the region, which 
is seen to be a "key driver of transformation in the region’ and ‘remains essential for 
fostering reconciliation and stability" (European Commission, 2018, p. 1). At his 2017 
State of the Union address, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 
specifically linked the need for "stability in our neighbourhood," with the need to 
"maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans," but he also added 
that in order to achieve that aim, "[a]ccession candidates must give the rule of law, justice 
and fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations." The EU-Western Balkans 
Summit, Sofia Declaration of 2018 also placed an emphasis on the need for partners to 
share European values and principles, while emphasizing shared security challenges 
(notably illegal migration, organized crime, resilience and cyber security) and the need 
for a market-friendly, investment-friendly environment. (European Council, 2018, pp. 1-
2). These may or may not be relatively new, more complex challenges, but certainly the 
EU’s discourse of common values is not new, while the specific difference that 
resilience-building makes is not evident. Thus, the EU’s policy in the region continues to 
be one that pursues stability and security through the promotion of EU values and norms 
(for similar conclusion in the EU’s Eastern policies, see Petrova & Delcour, 2019). 
 
The three-year assessment of the EUGS provides more evidence that resilience 
has made little difference to the way the EU works in the region. According to this report, 
"[i]n the Balkans, alongside a reinvigorated European perspective, the EU has directly 
engaged in resilience-building in areas such as rule of law, economic development, 
employment and connectivity" (European External Action Service, 2019, p. 23). It would 
seem then that despite the resilience "turn," the EU’s initiatives in the region remain 
unchanged. In the annex attached to the document illustrating how the EUGS has been 
implemented in the Western Balkans in "practice," it is explained how the focus has been 
on implementing the usual EU enlargement tools ("a strict and fair conditionality"), and 
that by re-energizing the EU’s commitment to the enlargement perspective, this has led to 
"irreversible progress towards the EU." Threats to resilience in the Western Balkans 
include not only domestic vulnerabilities in the candidate countries (e.g. weak 
governance and rule of law structures), but the EU’s failure to demonstrate a clear 
 
 
commitment to the region’s accession (European Commission, 2019, p. 2). Again, these 
are all well-established "truth" in the EU’s enlargement approach, which remains 
unaltered after the adoption of the EUGS.  
 
In order to better understand the EU’s role in the region, we examine in more 
detail the case of Bosnia, which we see as emblematic of the EU’s wider engagement in 
the Western Balkans and the way the EU has used member state-building as a strategy for 
peacebuilding (Juncos, 2012). When it comes to the implementation of resilience, this 
case shows that achieving integration of efforts has consumed a lot of the energy of EU 
peacebuilders, while there has been less attention to fostering local ownership and a more 
inclusive approach that respects and engages local agency in all its forms. We thus 
question whether the EU has been building "a genuine and inclusive positive peace" 
(European Parliament 2018, p. 1). This also undermines the idea that the EU is engaged 
in a new approach focused on building "resilient societies,", drawing upon underlying 
societal or institutional strengths and resources, or "fostering societies better empowered 
to identify and solve their own problems" (European Commission & High 
Representative, 2017, p. 23). Instead, the EU’s approach appears to be a combination of 
enlargement-driven conditionality (in the form of democracy, free markets and rule of 
law), plus advocating an "integrated approach." 
 
Promoting an integrated approach 
 
To a great extent, the obsession for coherence and ensuring an integrated approach goes 
back to the early stages of the EU’s intervention in Bosnia when the EU adopted a 
Comprehensive Strategy for Bosnia Herzegovina (European Council, 2004), but has 
become a constant over the years. The EU’s search for an integrated approach has less to 
do with a new understanding of complex social phenomena than with the multiplicity of 
EU and international actors and agendas in contemporary interventions. Bosnia is 
archetypal of a dense network of actors involved, including the Council of Europe, the 
EU, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to 
mention a few. To this mix, one can add a vast number of nongovernmental organizations 
 
 
and other bilateral donors (for example, EU member states). Thus, our interviewees often 
complained about problems of coordination on the ground due to the existence of a 
multitude of activities, launched at different stages and motivated by different rationales, 
which complicate overall efforts at ensuring resilience and capacity building. As 
summarized by an interviewee (#3), this is because “they are starting some projects in 
different phases from one another and they don’t really know what’s going on – what 
projects are implemented, what they have achieved so far” (see also interviews #2, #3, 
#6, #8, #11). While such problems are not specific to the EU, but affect other 
international actors, in the case of EU efforts in Bosnia, interviewees felt that these were 
hindered by the fragmentation of the EU’s presence on the ground (e.g. the 
Commission’s delegation, EU double-hatted Special Representative, and a military 
operation, EU Force Althea (EUFOR)).  
 
Given these perceptions among EU officials, it is not surprising that a lot of 
energy and efforts have focused on promoting more coherence. But, even despite the 
EU’s commitment to a comprehensive/integrated approach problems persisted at the time 
of the interviews (November 2016). According to one interviewee (#4), “you don’t see 
much coherence in terms of policies towards Bosnia among EU Member States’ 
embassies.” Each member state might develop its own initiatives alongside those of the 
Commission, EU Special Representative, or EUFOR, but these are not always 
coordinated. Moreover, according to one interviewee, in the case of the EU’s activities in 
Bosnia, problems of institutional (in)coherence were still evident in the relations between 
the EU Special Representative and the EU Delegation despite the double-hatting 
arrangement. More specifically, he argued that “they don’t know what each other is 
doing, which programmes they’re working on, because their superiors are different and 
they’re sending information to their own departments in Brussels” (interview #3). For 
many interviewees, the turn to resilience provided an opportunity to solve some of these 
problems by encouraging more joint planning, joint programming, and implementation in 
the medium and the long term as envisaged by the Joint Communication on resilience 




Complexity (or the lack of engagement with it) 
 
Complexity has also complicated the EU’s peacebuilding activities in Bosnia. In 
particular, our analysis shows that the EU has failed to engage with social and political 
orders that cannot be captured by the kind of approaches that have so far been preferred 
by the EU. For instance, a recurrent theme mentioned by interviewees was the 
fragmentation of the political system in Bosnia itself, and a problem that is compounded 
by the legacies of war (interviews #4, #12). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the complex 
institutional set-up of the country as a result of the Dayton Agreement complicates the 
EU’s peacebuilding activities in the country and attempts to build the capacities at the 
state level have often been rejected at the entity level, in particular by Bosnian Serbs 
(Interviews #2, #5, #6, #12). For instance, one interviewee explained, “you need to 
understand that the justice system in BiH is very fragmented, it is not a hierarchical 
system” (Interview #1). Despite this complexity, the EU’s strategy continues to be one 
that pursues linear functional models of liberal intervention that adopt state-centric and 
functionalist approaches (Edmunds & Juncos, 2019).  
 
This is also evident if one examines EU member statebuilding approaches over the 
past two decades or so. Despite Bosnia still being affected by the legacies of conflict, past 
EU initiatives have promoted a very narrow understanding of peacebuilding as institution 
building or so-called member statebuilding, while neglecting wider bottom-up initiatives 
or human-centered approaches (Belloni, 2020; Juncos, 2012). For instance, out of the 16 
areas set out in the EU Feasibility Study (2003) which the country had to make progress 
towards, most of them focused on (state-centric) institution building: such as the 
development of a more effective government, public administration and judiciary at the 
state level. The establishment of a centralized police then became one of the key 
priorities of the EU in the country during the 2000s and when that failed and the EU 
Police Mission was closed down, the EU’s military force in the country, EUFOR 
ALTHEA, launched its capacity-building programs for the Bosnian Army. Financially, 
institution-building was clearly a priority in Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) and of the follow-up Instrument for Pre-
 
 
Accession Assistance (IPA) (Bechev & Andreev, 2005). More significantly, according to 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Kostovicova, and Randazzo (2018), “the EU state-centric approach 
focused on institutional strengthening within distinctive policy domains (policy ‘silos’) 
has not been able to dislodge the informal networks which operate transinstitutionally and 
transnationally” (p. 23). This has had the effect of further undermining the EU’s 
peacebuilding activities in the country.  
 
The rhetoric and practice of local ownership 
 
The EU’s commitment to local ownership has not fared better. With the publication of 
the EUGS, the EU has continued to emphasize the principle of ownership. As stated in 
the 2018 Communication on Enlargement "[i]t is now up to the countries’ authorities, 
with the support of their societies, to take ownership and deliver on the well-known 
conditions for accession" (European Commission, 2018, p. 3). However, evidence of EU 
engagement in the Western Balkans and beyond suggests that the EU has been struggling 
to match its peacebuilding practice with its proclaimed principles. Deficient local 
ownership, one way or another, has been documented in both Bosnia and Kosovo where 
the EU is well known for its executive interventions and top down approaches 
(Tolksdorf, 2014; Vandemoortele, 2012; Kappler & Lemay-Hébert, 2016; Qehaja & 
Prezelj, 2017). In addition, in the case of Bosnia, for instance, it has been noted that EU 
peacebuilding interventions have struggled to involve nonstate actors, despite the country 
having a comparatively advanced civil society sector (Kappler & Richmond, 2011). As 
Balfour (2017, p. 20) notes, the EU’s engagement with the region needs to be far more 
dynamic and bottom-up. For all its promotion of "self-sustainability" the EU still falls 
back on externally-led interventions for fear of a reversion to old habits and prejudices.  
 
Interviews with key stakeholders conducted at the end of 2016 raised the issue that, 
despite the EUGS rhetoric, EU programs were still launched without prior or appropriate 
knowledge of the local context or without the meaningful engagement of local partners. 
There were many complaints for not involving local stakeholders in the formulation and 
implementation of projects (interviews #3, #7, #11,  #15). Most programs are conceived 
 
 
overseas by external actors with their own ideas of what they want to do, regardless of 
what has been done in the past, what has worked, what has not and what the current 
needs are (interview #10). In the best case, this has resulted in duplication of activities, in 
the worst case, in the creation and perpetuation of initiatives that are not suited to local 
needs. Among the most notable concerns are the difficulties of developing close 
relationships with local actors and gaining local country knowledge when donor postings 
and projects may only be short term in nature such as in the case of military and civilian 
crisis management operations in the Balkans. For instance, Bosnian interviewees 
complained about the high rotational turnaround of international staff and the lack of 
local knowledge, including knowledge of the local language (interviews #3, #10, #11, 
#12).  
 
Hence, a key lesson identified was the need to develop programs that meet local needs 
and avoid duplication. As one interviewee (#4) put it, “there is now an understanding that 
you have to adapt to local needs,” which “requires us to be in constant communication 
with local partners. Now we don’t just give local partners what they ask for, but we also 
make sure what they are asking for aligns with our general objectives and theirs, too.”  
Several interviewees mentioned that, to achieve this, a best practice is for one to establish 
and/or run needs assessments prior to the launch of the programs, consultations with local 
actors, as well as monitoring and evaluation systems (interviews #3, #4, #14).  
 
Human agency and local capacities 
 
Last, but not least, problems implementing local ownership are intrinsically related to the 
way the EU understands capacity and agency (or the lack of) in Bosnia (see also 
Edmunds & Juncos, 2019). According to Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al. (2018), problems in the 
Balkans have usually been associated with poor capacity, “thus calling for further 
reinforcement of mechanisms that monitor, support and enhance said capacity” (p. 17). 
And while both local and international actors recognize an improvement in the capacities 
of Bosnian partners (usually through the idea of becoming a "security provider" rather 
than a "security recipient"), there are still deeply in-grained ideas about the lack of 
 
 
capacity at the local level. For instance, when it comes to supporting security sector 
reform in Bosnia, “this means starting from scratch [emphasis added] because you have 
the police who were militarised during the war […] And you need some new 
arrangements in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreements, because now you have 
to establish common institutions at the state level” (interview #3).  
 
This problematization of capacity deficits at the local level plays a key role in 
legitimizing various forms of externally-driven EU resilience building initiative. It 
presents the host environment as either an empty shell waiting to be filled (Lemay-
Hébert, 2011) or a dysfunctional space in need of correction. Either of these conceptions 
are in contradiction with the ideas underpinning resilience building approaches. They go 
against the fourth contribution of resilience highlighted earlier, which is to emphasize 
human agency and the capacities of local people. This is despite the Joint Communication 
calling for a people-centered and development-oriented approach that fosters self-reliance 
and enables people to live in dignity as contributors to their society (European 
Commission & High Representative, 2017, p.11). 
 
Resilience, stability, and principled pragmatism in Bosnia 
 
As discussed above, the new "resilience turn" at the EU seems to have made little mark 
on the EU’s enlargement policies in the Balkans and in Bosnia, specifically. Of the four 
features, resilience has only translated into a continued focus on the implementation of 
the integrated approach, while the EU has largely neglected the added value of 
complexity thinking and deeper understandings of local ownership and local capacities. 
In his study of EU peacebuilding in the Western Balkans, Belloni (2020) agrees that 
"while resilience […] still does not have a clear policy impact on the Balkans, ‘principled 
pragmatism’ has an intuitive appeal among policy-makers that makes it immediately 
relevant" (p. 235). In line with principled pragmatism, the EU has sought to achieve a 
difficult balance between stability and principles. Yet, while the rhetoric continues to put 
"fundamental values" at the core of the enlargement process, in practice, many observers 
have argued that stability, and the support for stabilitocrats has driven EU policy in the 
 
 
2010s (Džankić, Keil,  & Kmezić, 2018). Thus, Belloni (2020, p. 235) concludes that 
principled pragmatism has led to the "sidelining of transformative ambitions" and that in 
countries like Bosnia this has meant that "stabilization prevailed over emancipation or 
transformation" (also Cooley, 2019). As long as semi-authoritarian elites continue to 
maintain stability and security for the EU (in the form of border control, counter-
terrorism and dealing with refugees), the potential of the "resilience turn" will remain 




While the EU continues to acknowledge the links between the enlargement policy and 
peacebuilding and despite the EUGS’ turn to resilience, resilience does not feature much, 
or at all, in EU enlargement documents (European Commission, 2019b, p. 8). Taking the 
four features of resilience (complexity, a systems approach, local ownership, and human 
capacity) as yardsticks to determine the extent to which the EU has incorporated 
resilience thinking into its peacebuilding activities, this article also concludes that the 
promise of resilience remains unfulfilled. Conceptually, we have argued that resilience 
seeks to address what it means to live with complexity and an uncertain world. It does 
this through making a positive appeal to our unique human qualities and our ability to 
withstand, adapt and even thrive in the face of adversity. In looking at how we cope with 
new challenges, resilience theories point to certain intangible human powers and 
resources that make us resilient beings. However, we found that this aspect of resilience 
thinking was entirely absent from EU understandings of resilient peacebuilding in the 
Balkans and is barely mentioned in the EUGS. 
 
The turn to human agency is something that has gained traction in other 
approaches to peacebuilding and development, most notably in arguments for the 
capabilities approach and the turn to the everyday practices of local communities. With a 
resilience approach, we might see human capacities or capabilities in terms of 
resourcefulness, self-understanding, awareness, reflexivity and the capacity to learn from 
experience. Most of all, it is the unique human ability to cope with challenges, something 
 
 
that cannot be captured by a purely instrumental logic. However, this is absent from the 
strategic understanding of the EU. Nor is there much more on the other characteristic of 
resilience that we identified--the shift to local capacities. This is largely absent from the 
EU’s approach despite the peacebuilding literature constantly emphasizing the 
importance of local engagement and working through civil society and despite the 
Western Balkans’ civil society being fairly vibrant. 
 
If the EU’s approach to building resilience in places like Bosnia fails to engage 
the key issues of local ownership and human agency despite some mention in the policy 
documents, then at least it makes more reference to complexity in its arguments in 
support of a new approach. In some arguments, the EU appears to adopt a complex 
systems approach which "requires a proper understanding of the linkages between 
different parts of the complex systems that govern and sustain states, societies and 
communities, as well as of how they respond when faced with sudden-onset shocks, 
recurrent or long-term stresses" (European Commission & High Representative, 2017, p. 
27). However, most of the time, complexity just means complicated as in things like 
globalization, climate change, demographic challenges, economic shocks, and other 
processes beyond the power of individual states to confront, or else it means that the EU 
must deal with multiple actors with competing agendas. The Western Balkans are a 
classic case of somewhere that is complicated, a place where chronic vulnerability and 
fragility exacerbate the impact of these pressures (European Commission & High 
Representative, 2017, p. 3). Moreover, we noted that any new ideas about dealing with 
complexity in a more pragmatic and innovative way soon give way to the EU’s normal 
focus on "core values" like democracy, rights, and rule of law.  
 
This is because maintaining the EU’s core identity is in conflict with some of the 
arguments for resilience--notably it represents a clash with the universal liberalism of 
past peacebuilding endeavors. But while this might also be a concern raised in relation to 
the peacebuilding approaches of other international organizations, what we highlight 
above all else in this article is the EU’s obsession with an integrated approach. Indeed, 
resilience theory’s emphasis on a systems approach has given way to an EU 
 
 
interpretation of what is "systematic" in its own actions. The divisions between its 
different departments and internal actors as well as its work with other international 
organizations and actors and the need to combine different strategies and interests are the 
main driving force behind the EUGS and its resilience turn. While our focus here has 
been on peacebuilding in the Western Balkans, we can say that this approach is indicative 
of a wider strategy as represented in the EUGS. 
 
Trying to work out what resilience is meant to be doing is difficult at the best of 
times. Trying to apply it to peacebuilding is even more challenging. Having identified 
four promising areas where a different understanding can be developed, we saw that few 
aspects of these were properly developed in the EU’s approach. The dominance of an 
integrated approach is to the detriment of developing a proper understanding of what 
resilience might do differently. In fact, by the end, we know more about how the EU 
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